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Abstract:	 This	 paper	 explores	 the	 relationship	 between	 ethnic	 fractionalization	 and	
social	 capital	between	1990-2005.	First,	using	data	 from	1990,	1997	and	2005	we	 test	
for	 time	 differences	 in	 the	 impact	 of	 ethnic	 fractionalization	 on	 social	 capital.	
Subsequently,	 we	 examine	 U.S.	 data	 for	 evidence	 consistent	 with	 the	 proposed	
outcomes	 in	 the	 conflict,	 contact,	or	hunker-down	 theses	discussed	 in	Putnam	 (2007).	
Putnam	(2007)	examines	what	happens	to	`”trust”	or	“social	capital”	when	individuals	of	
different	 ethnicity	 are	 introduced	 into	 social,	 political	 and/or	 economic	 groups	 over	
time.	 Using	 an	 instrumental	 variable	 (IV)	 estimator,	 we	 find	 little	 evidence	 of	
heterogeneity	in	the	impact	of	ethnic	fractionalization	on	social	capital	over	our	period	
of	analysis.	In	addition,	using	both	fixed	effect	and	IV	estimators,	we	reject	the	contact	
hypothesis,	 but	 find	 evidence	 consistent	 with	 the	 outcomes	 predicted	 in	 both	 the	
conflict	hypothesis	and	Putnam's	hunker-down	hypothesis,	in	inter-ethnic	relations.	Due	
to	data	 limitations,	we	are	unable	 to	 test	directly	which	of	 these	 two	 thesis	 are	more	
relevant	for	the	U.S	experience.	However,	we	provide	suggestive	evidence	in	support	of	
the	 conflict	 hypothesis	 over	 the	 hunker-down	 hypothesis.	 Our	 results	 suggest	 that	
between	 1990-2005,	 as	 communities	 in	 the	 U.S	 became	 more	 diverse,	 there	 was	 a	
tendency	for	social	capital	to	decline.	
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1 Introduction and Motivation
The publication of Putnam (2007), “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and
Community in the Twenty-First Century and the significant increase in cross-
national immigration of the last thirty years has been the catalyst that has
merged the economics/political science/sociology/social psychology liter-
atures in an effort to understand how ethnic diversity impacts the evolution
of political, social, and economic outcomes over time. More specifically, so-
cial connectedness forms one of the basic building blocks for downstream
economic, political and social outcomes. The impact of ethnic diversity on
social connectedness and ultimate economic and political performance is of
paramount importance as the world becomes more ethnically integrated.
There are three possible outcomes of the impact of increased diversity on
social connections. The first discussed in Allport (1954) is what he labeled
as the contact hypothesis. Allport (1954) suggests that increased contact with
people of different ethnicities leads to increased “inter-ethnic tolerance”. In
effect, the more contact we have across ethnic lines the more likely it is that
we overcome ignorance and trust each other more. The second outcome
can be classified as one of two dimensions of the constriction thesis. In par-
ticular, the conflict hypothesis, suggests that contention over scarce resources,
the fear of re-distributive policies, and other zero-sum situations leads to in-
creasing out-group distrust.1 The third outcome is described in the hunker-
down hypothesis which suggests that greater inter-ethnic interaction leads not
only to more out-group distrust, but also to more in-group distrust as well.
As with Putnam (2007) much of the research into this relationship has
attempted to examine this issue at the behavioral level using survey data.
Survey data, though gathered at the individual level, is fraught with bias
in terms of how questions are posed, social, economic, and political circum-
stances surrounding respondents, and processes used to aggregate and an-
alyze the data. Moreover, measuring social capital has also been a challenge
since definition differences exist and the concept is multidimensional in na-
ture.
This research acknowledges the definition challenge in measuring so-
cial capital but for empirical purposes adopts the definition and measure of
social capital proposed in Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2006), here-
after (RGF). RGF (2006) uses a social capital index that is based on member-
ship in social clubs, religious organizations, political organizations etc.2
Our research examines two related questions:
• Are there time differences in the relationship between ethnic diversity
and social capital?
• Is there evidence supporting the contact, conflict, and/or hunker-down
1 See Putnam 2007 page 142.
2 A more detailed explanation of the index is given in section 4 of this paper.
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hypotheses of social interaction in the United States?
Our research is related to RGF (2006) as we make use of the same so-
cial capital index in our analysis. In addition, the variables they include
in their estimation of the correlates of social capital, provide the building
blocks for the empirical model we use to examine the questions highlighted
above. Despite these similarities, our research differs from RGF (2006) in
three ways. First, we are focused on investigating heterogeneity in the im-
pact of ethnic fractionalization on social capital across time rather than only
identifying inputs into the production of social capital at the level of US
counties. Second, rather than using the 1990-1997 time period considered
by RGF (2006) we focus on a longer time period: 1990-2005. Finally, this
research examines the applicability of the contact hypothesis or the constrict
claim in the U.S. The constrict claim posits that ethnic diversity negatively
affects social cohesion. Both the conflict and hunker-down propositions pro-
vide two different channels through which this happens. The conflict propo-
sition of inter-ethnic relation proposes that as diversity increases. distrust
for other groups rises which ultimately affects social capital adversely. In
contrast, the hunker down proposition suggests as diversity increases social
capital declines because individuals reduce social engagement with people
within their ethnic group as well as those outside of their ethnic group. In
particular, Putnam (2007) makes the argument that agents faced with in-
creased ethnic diversity would “hunker-down” like a turtle in an attempt
to protect themselves from the uncertainty created by engaging people of a
different ethnic group.3
To answer the first question, similar to RGF (2006), we estimate a model
of social capital production at the county level across three time periods.
We control for potential factors that could impact social capital formation
at the county level. We also address potential omitted variable bias using
instrumental variables (IVs). We test for heterogeneity in the impact of eth-
nic fractionalization on social capital over time by comparing the estimated
impacts across three periods using t-tests.
To address the second question we pool the data and estimate models
of social capital production. The models of social interaction highlighted in
Putnam (2007) lead to testable predictions. In particular, if social interac-
tions follow the contact hypothesis then we should expect a positive relation-
ship between ethnic fractionalization and social capital. If either of the other
two aforementioned theses are more relevant, we should find a negative re-
lationship.
As unbiased estimated effects are critical for identifying which of these
claims are relevant, we exploit the panel nature of our data and estimate
parameters using a fixed effect (FE) model specification. Using a FE specifi-
3 While our data does not allow us to test directly whether conflict or hunker-down hy-
potheses is more relevant for the U.S experience, we provide descriptive analysis that
can suggest the relevance of one theory over the other.
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cation eliminates most sources of selection bias by identifying effects using
only variation over time within a county. To ensure our results are robust,
we also estimate an IV model using fixed effects (FE-IV). The FE-IV model
control for the possible, though unlikely, presence of time-varying unob-
servables at the county level that are correlated with ethnic fractionalization
and social capital.4
Our results suggest that after controlling for potential selectivity issues,
there are no significant time differences in the relationship between ethnic
fractionalization and social capital between 1990-2005. Specifically, though
the magnitude of the coefficient increased over time, t-tests of differences in
means reveal that there are no statistical differences in coefficient size over
time. We also find no evidence in support of the contact hypothesis. Our
estimates provide evidence in support of conflict and/or hunker-down theses.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing answers to ques-
tions that are not only timely, but could inform current discussions on the
potential effects of increased diversity through immigration. The U.S. has
experienced a significant influx of immigrants over the last few decades and
this increase in immigrants has increased ethnic diversity within and across
communities in the U.S. While Ottaviano and Peri (2012) provide evidence
of the positive impact of immigrants on native wages,less is known about
the impact of increased diversity on social capital formation within com-
munities.5 In addition, given that the past literature suggests that social
capital is an important determinant of macroeconomic performance,6 di-
versity may play an indirect role in affecting macroeconomic performance,
therefore, its effect on social capital should be further examined. Further,
since Putnam (2000) suggests that social capital may be declining within
communities in the U.S., it is imperative that we examine whether diversity
is a driver or it attenuates social capital. Finally, while research like Put-
nam (2007) have highlighted social interaction models hypothesizing the
potential outcomes of increased ethnically-diverse social interaction, empir-
ical evidence supporting or refuting these theses has not been established.
Our paper fills this gap for the U.S. by providing evidence that increases in
ethnic fractionalization during 1990-2005 has not fostered increased social
capital formation.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. In section two, we review the
past literature on social capital, group formation, and trust. Section three
4 While we cannot think of any unobservable that fits this criteria we cannot rule it out,
hence, this robustness check using FE-IV.
5 There is a growing literature considering the impact of immigrants on various outcomes
in the U.S. Past research, like Card (2005) shows no significant effect on relative wages
of native dropouts from relative supply of less-educated workers. Diette and Uwaifo
Oyelere (2014) provide some evidence of small negative effects of immigrants with lim-
ited English on native students performance and Borjas (2013) suggests that the net ben-
efit of immigrants to the native born population is trivial.
6 See Durlauf (2002).
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provides our conceptual framework and testable hypotheses. In section
four, we provide a summary and descriptive analysis of the data sets used
in this paper. Section five provides the empirical framework and justifica-
tion of the modeling strategy. Section six summarizes our results, provides
robustness checks and explains the limitations of the data and modeling
strategy. This section also explores descriptive evidence that allows us to
deduce whether the conflict or the hunker-down thesis is more consistent
with the U.S data. Our summary and conclusion is found in section seven.
2 Literature Review and Background
Historically, economists have been concerned about how efficiently re-
sources have been employed by economic agents creating long-term growth
and development and ultimately solving the collective action problem. Thou-
gh technical aspects have dominated the discussion in research by Solow
(1956) and Swan (1956), North and Thomas (1973) examining the evolu-
tion of societies across time finds that choices made by nation-states around
economic and political institutions impacted the downstream path of the
nation-state. These choices influenced the actions of economic agents in
ways that incentivized collective action leading to greater economic growth
and development or inhibited such activity leading to economic under-per-
formance and stagnation. Growth and development is usually a long-term
process that depend on agents efficiently employing talent and resources
currently for the promise of a significantly larger future pay-off. This pro-
cess of investment has, in real terms, an uncertain outcome and in most
cases leads involved parties to seek methods that reduces the risk of nega-
tive or unwanted outcomes. Economic agents use all available information
in making their investment choices. Social connections provide a multi-
plicity of dimensions that offer information about an investment partner’s
future behavior and can be an imperfect substitute for repeated interaction.
In effect, social similarities, though imperfect, can foster the production of
social and economic networks that ultimately reduces uncertainty over the
investment horizon. As suggested by Dasgupta (1988), “trust” among eco-
nomic agents is the major ingredient necessary for growth and development
to take place efficiently.
Sociologists and social psychologists, in a more precise way, examine
the definition and evolution of trust, or in more broad terms “social capi-
tal”. They further examine how social characteristics such as race, religion,
and ethnic origin through their impact on social capital influence social, po-
litical and even economic outcomes. Van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) define
social cohesion as a more fitting “neutral” term, given the variation in the
definition of social capital provided by multiple authors including Bourdieu
(1987), Coleman (1990), and Putnam and Nanetti (1993). Van der Meer and
Tolsma (2014, pp. 460-461) define social capital “as the degree of intercon-
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nectedness between individuals that is both a result and a cause of public
and civic life. It encompasses feelings of commitment, trust and norms of
reciprocity, and is demonstrated by participation in networks and civic or-
ganization.”. In an effort to understand the evolution of social capital social
scientists have relied on early work by Blummer (1958) which attempts to
address how issues of race and ethnicity play a role in constructing the so-
cial fabric of communities.
Economists have argued that social capital positively influences economic
growth and development because trust reduces transaction costs and fa-
cilitates the cooperation necessary to solve the collective action problem.7
Though most researchers support the idea that social capital leads to more
efficient production, there are a few researchers who hold a contrary view.8
They argue that the definition of social capital is problematic and they do
not believe that linkages that enhance interaction are “capital” in the true
sense. Our research however, leans on the definition provided in the Soci-
ology, Social Psychology and Political Science research and is reviewed in
Van der Meer and Tolsma (2014). These authors define social cohesion as
a broader definition of social capital as “the degree of interconnectedness
between individuals that is both a result and cause of public and civic life”.
We operationalize this definition using the measurement approach of RFG
(2006).
Our research conceptualization has its roots in the work of Alesina and
La Ferrara (2004), Putnam (2007) and RGF (2006). These papers examine the
impact of ethnic diversity on social capital. Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) ex-
amines social capital indirectly, arguing that increased diversity leads com-
munities to shift their consumption preferences for private goods over pub-
lic goods. Implicit in their argument is the conflict hypothesis, which ar-
gues that an increase in ethnic diversity increases competition among ethnic
groups for scarce resources, thus decreasing social capital.9 Putnam (2007)
advocates examining how increased diversity, within and across countries,
impacts social, economic, and political outcomes. Putnam (2007) suggests
that networks are as integral to production as are physical capital and la-
bor. Since networks consist of people who trust one another due to shared
common values and characteristics, it is important to understand how net-
works respond to change and greater heterogeneity in those key character-
istics. RGF (2007) formulate a measure of social capital using county level
data from the Regional Economic Information System. Their estimation of
the determinants of social capital empirically confirm results found by both
Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) and Putnam (2007) that increased ethnic di-
7 See Colman (1988 and 1990) and Putnam (1993).
8 See Portes (1998), Arrow (2000), Solow (2000), Defilipis (2001) and Durlauf (2002).
9 Our research takes a more direct approach by following the work of Putnam (2007)
which, through the use of survey data, examines directly the impact of diversity on social
capital.
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versity does indeed negatively impact the formation of social capital.
For empirical clarity we provide context for our analysis by examining
social capital across the four dimensions suggested by Van de Meer and
Tolsma (2014), formality, mode, target and geographical scope. Our mea-
sure of social capital is formal in the Pichler and Wallace (2007) sense and is
based on data of voluntary membership in organization within a particular
county within a state in the U.S. The mode of the measure used is not atti-
tudinal, given that it is not developed from survey data but is behavioral
as individuals voluntarily join social groups that are consistent with their
own social norms. The target of our measure is the general population as
we try to access the impact of changing ethnic make-up of a county on the
production of a formal or statistical measure of social capital. The geograph-
ical scope of the social capital measure is relatively large as we examine the
production of social cohesion at the county level.
Using U.S. county level data, RFG (2006) developed measures of social
capital which they argue are proxies for trust across communities. Follow-
ing Putnam (1993), which argues that associational activities help commu-
nities solve collective action problems, RGF (2006) measure social capital
by counting membership in sports clubs, religious organizations, political
clubs, and the like across U.S. counties. Using these data, they created an
index through the use of principal components analysis. They then exam-
ined how demographic variables, including ethnic fractionalization, explain
variation in social capital across counties and time. To construct the ethnic
fractionalization variable we follow the same method used in RGF (2006),
which was originally constructed in Alesina et al. (1999).10 As noted by
Van Der Meer and Tolsma (2014) this index is similar to the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, which can be interpreted as the probability that two ran-
domly selected individuals living in the same geographical area have dif-
ferent ethnic backgrounds. The in-group relative to out-group distinction
that is so prevalent in the social cohesion literature is difficult given this
data does not explicitly measure attitudes across groups. However, our
measure of ethnic diversity is based on Blummer (1958) and later Quillian
(1995) where racial preference is determined by group position rather than
individual preferences as is the case in most studies using survey data.
While RGF’s measure captures multiple dimensions of social capital, it is
important to mention that this measure of social capital is not without criti-
cism11 For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that Putnam-type social
capital measures that use associational activities are unrelated to trust. Us-
ing survey data, they find that their measure of trust was at best weakly
correlated with associational activities and concluded that these activities
10 The precise construction of the ethnic fractionalization variable can be found in the Ap-
pendix.
11 Like most indexes, the RGF social capital measure has limitations. We discuss some of
these in more detail in section 7.
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do not explain trust between individuals. However, trust is difficult to mea-
sure and the measures of trust in the World Value Survey used by these
authors is imperfect. It is also clear that social capital is a multi-dimensional
concept in which trust is but one of its many facets. Given these facts, it
remains interesting to examine the impact of ethnic fractionalization on the
production of social capital across time, even if the RGF measure of social
capital is an imperfect proxy for trust.
3 Conceptual Framework
To understand how social capital is developed over time, we focus on
Blau’s (1977) theory based on the homophily principle. The homophily
principle states that people who are similar across socio-demographic di-
mensions are more likely to trust one another and develop social capital.
RGF’ (2006) definition of organizations suggests that members of organiza-
tions tend to exist in similar socio-demographic space. This theoretical space
is defined across characteristics such as race, income, education, age, and
other demographic factors. Figure (1) reveals that initial socio-demographic
space is made up of homogenous member across race, income, education
and other socio-economic characteristics. McPherson, Popielarz, and Dro-
biic (1992), hereafter (MPD), use Blau’s model in a dynamic context to ex-
amine the impact of social networks on organizational behavior over time.
In particular, MPD’s model examines how socio-demographic changes over
time impact the missions and goals of the organization as revealed in Fig-
ure (1). Over time as new members are added the socio-demographic space
could retain its basic characteristic i.e., homogeneous and cohesive, if new
members generally have the same or similar socioeconomic characteristic.
However, if new members have different socioeconomic characteristics the
socio-demographic space could become more heterogenous and less cohe-
sive leading to the models first discussed in Allport (1954) and empirically
examined in Putnam (2007).
While the aforementioned conceptual framework explains the basic struc-
ture of groups, an evolutionary model is needed to explain how groups
change over time as members enter and leave. MPD (1992) suggests there
are three factors to consider: variation, retention, and selection. Variation fo-
cuses on differences in socio-demographic characteristics such as race, in-
come, and age. Retention examines how groups recruit members to keep
their socio-demographic space constant. A group able to keep its socio-
demographic space constant will exhibit more “group-likeaˆ behavior. Se-
lection involves the recruitment of new members and is of concern because
group members tend to bring in new members through the homophilous
network ties among existing members.
Since it is the selection process that governs the evolution of the group
over time, it is important to identify whether new entrants are stabilizing or
Copyright c© 2018 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 8
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disruptive selections. Stabilizing selection occurs when the recruitment/attri-
tion ratio is smaller for members further away from the center in socio-
demographic space. This would make the group members more similar
over time. Disruptive selection occurs when the recruitment/attrition ra-
tio is greater for members away from the center in demographic space,
causing the group to generalize and increase the variance over its socio-
demographic dimensions. Selection can clearly impact the behavior of the
group in its effort to achieve goals.
Figure 1 - Representation of Conceptual Framework
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The focus of this paper is the relationship between variation in a de-
mographic variable associated with group members and trust across the
group’s membership. More specifically, we examine how variations in the
race and ethnicity of group members impact the production of social capital.
Essentially testing whether increases in racial diversity in a county induces
disruptive selection which over time reduces social capital. To investigate the
three aforementioned theses in a more formal fashion we adopt an empirical
model similar to that of RGF (2006).
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4 Detailed Data Description
The data used to examine our questions of interest is U.S. Census data for
1990, 1995 and 2005 along with the social capital index used in RGF (2006).
The data used by RGF to construct this index was first developed by Anil
Rupasingha and Stephan J. Goetz in 1992 and is housed in the Northeast Re-
gional Center for Rural Development at the College of Agricultural Sciences
at Penn-State.12 The Northeast Regional Center’s data repository contains
social capital data for the years 1990, 1997, 2005 and 2009 for each county
in the continental U.S.13 We make use of 1990, 1997 and 2005 data solely for
consistency because the calculation of the index is different for the 2009 sur-
vey. Specifically, the method used to create the social capital index for 2009
is incompatible with the data available for 1990.14
Table 1 - Components of the Social Capital IndexTable A1: Components of the Social Capital Index
Name Description
Bowling centers Total number of bowling centers
Civic associations Total number of civic and social associations
Gyms Total number of physical fitness facilities
Golf courses Total number of golf courses
Religious organizations Total number of religious organizations
Sports clubs Total number of sports clubs
Recreation clubs Total number of recreation clubs
Political groups Total number of political organizations
Professional groups Total number of professional organizations
Business groups Total number of business organizations
Labor groups Total number of labor organizations
Other groups Total number of other membership organizations
Total organizations Aggregate sum of organizations listed above
Census responses Census response rate
Non-profit organizations Total number of not-for-profit organizations
Population Total residential population
Voting fraction Voting fraction from nearest Presidential election
35
12 It is important to mention that apart from the share of democratic votes in a recent pres-
idential election in a county and the share of votes for the leading candidate in the most
recent presidential election, all control variables both dependent and independent used
in the analysis are measured in 1990, 1995 and 2005 respectively or adjacent years. Details
of exact year variable is measured can be found in the appendix. Also, all the variables
that are used to construct the social capital index apart from voting fraction from nearest
Presidential election are measured in the year of analysis.
13 Note that this data is restricted to 48 out of 50 states. Hawaii and Alaska are excluded.
14 It is important to note that the 1997 and 2005 surveys can be recalculated to be compatible
with the method used in the 2009 panel. However we choose not to consider 1997-2009
period given the recession happened during this period and could serve as a confound-
ing factor in our econometric analysis. Moreover, given the changes in social interaction
and networking from the mid 2000s through the increased availability of the internet and
social media, our measure of social capital is likely to be less precise for more recent data.
Hence, it is preferable to consider the period 1990-2005 rather than 1997-2009.
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Table (1) provides the components used by RGF (2006) to build the social
capital index. This is a composite index created using principle components
analysis. The specific variables used in the index are: the aggregate total of
listed organizations and non-profit organizations as well as the the census
response rate and voting fraction of the population.15 Summary statistics
for the variables used to create the social capital index are presented in Table
(2). Because the social capital index can range from negative to positive, the
mean values in each panel are generally near zero.16
The definitions for the independent variables used in our empirical anal-
ysis are found in Table (3). This data is derived from the CenStats Databases
of the United States Census Bureau (2010). The independent variables are
constrained to all counties in the continental United States. Summary statis-
tics of these variables can be found in Table (4) and the description of how
these variables are calculated is highlighted in the appendix. This research
uses control variables found in most of the work examining ethnicity and
social capital including Alesina and La Ferrara (2004), RFG (2006), and Gun-
delach (2014). Control variables other than the ethnic fractionalization mea-
sure(s) include income per capital, education, fraction of family households,
median age and median age squared, a dummy variable for urban relative
to rural population per square mile, population density per square mile,
time the average resident has spent in a given county and the percent of the
population made-up of working women.17 High wages tend to be associ-
ated with employment that requires less hours, leaving more time for civic
and social engagement. Putnam (1995), Helliwell and Putnam (1999) as well
as Glaeser et al., (2002) have all documented the positive relationship be-
tween social and human capital. RGF(2006) argues that at the community
level, education attainment is highly correlated in a positive manner with
civic engagement. Putnam (1995) cites the breakdown of traditional family
structure as being negatively related to social capital formation. However,
the family is usually associated with more involvement in local schools and
other social initiative suggesting that the increase in the proportion of intact
family units should be associated with increase social capital. Since Putnam
(1995) suggests that high levels of social involvement tend be positively cor-
related with age we include a variable that captures age as well as following
Glaeser et. al (2000) we include an age squared term capturing the life cycle
relationship of social capital. Because we believe that social interaction in
rural areas differ from that in more metropolitan areas we follow Putnam
15 It should be noted that the voting fraction is taken from the nearest Presidential elec-
tion. For the 1997 and 2005 panels, these are the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections,
respectively. The 1990 panel averages data from the 1988 and 1992 Presidential election.
16 The social capital index for the year 2005 is calculated excluding recreation clubs and
“other groups”.
17 Some variables included in RGF(2006) are not included in our empirical model because of
insufficient theoretical justification for their inclusion in the production of social capital.
For example share Black in a county.
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Table 2 - Descriptive Data (Dependent Variable and Components)Table A2: Descriptive Data (Dependent Variable and Components)
(1990) (1997) (2005)
Social capital 0.001 0.001 0.000∗∗∗
(1.350) (1.298) (1.646)
Bowling centers 1.910 1.766 1.490
(4.671) (3.954) (3.106)
Civic associations 12.513 11.489 10.097
(34.927) (30.602) (24.765)
Gyms 2.444 3.541 10.161
(7.980) (11.874) (30.806)
Golf courses 0.888 1.949 3.825
(2.270) (3.854) (7.269)
Religious organizations 40.979 50.711 54.982
(87.040) (106.072) (116.530)
Sports clubs 0.288 0.623 0.244
(1.662) (2.877) (1.038)
Recreation clubs 4.172 4.779
(10.119) (11.758)
Political groups 0.495 0.578 0.950
(2.112) (2.650) (4.442)
Professional groups 1.670 2.499 2.407
(7.268) (10.465) (11.259)
Business groups 3.879 4.396 5.572
(13.131) (14.004) (17.548)
Labor groups 6.071 6.008 5.132
(19.293) (18.067) (15.991)
Other groups 3.012 2.365916
(8.028) (5.448)
Total organizations 78.320 90.795 94.859
(188.472) (209.379) (218.882)
Census responses 66.666∗ 62.519∗∗ 64.248
(8.213) (8.831) (8.881)
Non-profit organizations 40.674 42.131 446.417∗∗∗
(152.390) (157.681) (1357.03)
Population 78832.7 84821.72 93837.78∗∗∗
(262630.9) (275600.5) (304866.5)
Voting fraction 54.001 52.888 58.256∗∗∗
(10.851) (9.805) (9.577)
Voting fraction (2nd) 60.265
(10.210)
All variables have a sample size of 3110 unless otherwise indicated by asterisks.
Includes standard deviation in parenthesis.
∗ N = 2434, ∗∗ N = 3066, ∗∗∗ N = 3107
∗∗∗ RGF’s data source for non-profit organizations is identical for 1990 and 1997 but
different for 2005.
36
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Table 3 - Description of Independent VariablesTable A3: Description of Independent Variables
Name Description/Definition
Ethnic Fractionalization Level of Diversity
Black Proportion Fraction of population that identifies as black
Income Per Capita Personal income per capita
Education Percent of the population that is over 25 and has a Bachelor’s Degree
Family Households Fraction of total households that are family households
Median Age Median age
Square of Median Age Square of median age variable
Urban 1 if county population is greater than 2500, 0 otherwise
Population Density Population per square mile
Residence Time Time resident spends in a given county
Working Women Percent of population made up of women in the labor force
37
(1995), Glaeser et. al (2000) and Brown (2001) and include a dummy vari-
able for rural relative to urban counties. We also include variables covering
population density per square mile and the average time spent by a resident
of each county in an effort to capture the behavior of city dwellers relative
to those living in more rural situations. Finally, to capture the changing role
of working women in the social structure we include a variable that capture
the percent of the county made-up of working women.
Figure (2) highlights the distribution of the social capital index across
the three time periods. This figure shows a slight leftward shift in the distri-
bution by 2005. This leftward shift is suggestive evidence of a reduction in
social capital over time. Figure (3) shows the distribution of ethnic diversity
(our primary variable of interest) across counties in the three survey peri-
ods. This figure suggests that the density of counties with little or no ethnic
fractionalization has declined overtime. Conversely, there is an increase in
the density of counties with more ethnic diversity.
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Table 4 - Descriptive Data (Independent Variables)Table A4: Descriptive Data (Independent Variables)
(1990) (1997) (2005)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.183 0.208∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.177) (0.177)
Racial Dominance 0.876 0.861∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
Black Proportion 0.086 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.145) (0.142)
Latino Proportion 0.039 0.051∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.081) (0.084)
White Proportion 0.869 0.854∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.159) (0.159)
Asian Proportion 0.006 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Income Per Capita 11122.81 17476.74 -263735
(2681.445) (3956.538) (1.59e07)
Education 13.475 16.493 18.647
(6.577) (7.809) (8.528)
Family Households 73.580 70.659∗∗ 68.417∗∗∗
(4.664) (4.801) (5.339)
Median Age 34.407 37.354 40.329
(3.611) (4.078) (5.178)
Square of Median Age 1196.867 1411.925 1653.246
(253.259) (296.384) (407.369)
Urban 0.963 0.965 0.960
(0.189) (0.185) (0.196)
Population Density 221.022 238.955∗∗ 253.655∗∗∗
(1438.214) (1649.197) (1735.426)
Residence Time −33.381∗ −44.520∗∗∗ 282.662∗∗∗∗
(6522.952) (3829.71) (8409.171)
Working Women 20.451∗∗ 22.139∗∗ 22.612∗∗∗
(2.954) (3.010) (3.105)
All variables have a sample size of 3110 unless otherwise indicated by the asterisks.
Includes standard deviation in parenthesis
∗ N = 3109 , ∗∗ N = 3108 , ∗∗∗ N = 3107 , ∗∗∗∗ N = 3106
38
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Figure 2 - Distribution of Social Capital Index Over Time
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Figure 3 - Distribution of Ethnic Fractionalization across Counties Over Time
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5 Methodology
Econometric Model for Question 1
We address the issue of time differences in the impact of ethnic diver-
sity on social capital by initially using a simple OLS model with standard
controls as depicted in equation (1).
Sc,t = ρ0t + ρ1,tec,t +
J∑
j=1
δj,txj,c,t + c,t (1)
In equation (1), S is social capital in county c in year t, e is ethnic frac-
tionalization in county c in year t, xj,c,t are additional explanatory/control
variables (j = 1, ....., J) that could affect social capital at the county level
and  is the error term. Our control variables include income per capita, the
percentage of the population over 25 with a Bachelor’s degree, the fraction
of family households over total households, a dummy variable differentiat-
ing urban or rural counties, the median age, a quadratic variable on median
age, and population density.18 We also include state fixed effects (not in-
cluded in RGF 2006) because a simple OLS estimation of equation (1) can
lead to biased estimates due to the potentially endogenous nature of ethnic
fractionalization. Specifically, our parameter of interest could suffer from
omitted variable bias if there is an unobserved determinant of social capi-
tal at the state level, correlated with ethnic fractionalization. For example,
differences in institutions and/or economic polices could be correlated with
ethnic fractionalization. At the same time these institutions and/or polices
could produce lower levels of trust across the population and hence lower
levels of social capital. We reduce the likelihood of this potential source
of bias in the estimation of ρ1 by introducing state fixed effects. In this in-
stance, the state fixed effects controls for time invariant institutions unique
to a state that potentially impacts social capital. Hence, the coefficients in
the model are estimated using variation across counties within a state at a
given period of time.
We derive estimates of ρ1 and other parameters for t= 1990, 1997 and
2005. These estimates are then examined for statistical differences using T-
18 Apart from population density, the independent variables used in estimation are a sub-
set of the variables included in RGF (2006) social capital empirical model. We choose
to exclude some variables RGF (2006) include in their model to reduce potential multi-
collinearity. For example we do not include share of family households with children
because of its potential collinearity with share of family households. We do not include a
nonlinear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and social capital because when
we graph social capital and ethnic fractionalization using a median spline or a lowess we
observe a linear relationship.
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tests.19 Although we are confident that the inclusion of state fixed effects
attenuates bias in our estimates, it is still possible to argue that even within
states, there exists an omitted variable that is correlated with ethnic frac-
tionalization across counties within a state and also correlated with social
capital accumulation. While we are unable to identify such a variable, we
cannot rule out this possibility. Hence, we address this potential source of
bias using instrumental variables (IV) and a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) esti-
mator. We estimate our coefficients of interests separately for the three time
periods considered. In the IV specification just as in the OLS specification,
we estimate the coefficient on ethnic fractionalization for each period and
test for significant differences in the estimates in each period using T-tests.
In this analysis we make use of two instruments which we refer to as
our preferred instruments. These instruments are level of inequality in the
county (Gini) and the share of Blacks in a county.20 As a robustness check,
later in the paper, we introduce two alternate instruments: the share of
democratic votes in a recent presidential election in a county and the share
of votes for the leading candidate in the most recent presidential election.
We combine the Gini and Black population proportion instruments in our
estimation because they satisfy the J-Hansen over identification restriction
test.21 In contrast, any other pair of instruments or combination of three in-
struments fail this test suggesting that at least one instrument is not valid.
The fact that only Gini and Black share satisfy the over-identification re-
striction in most instances suggests that at least one of these instruments
is valid. While our other alternate instruments appear exogenous, the Gini
and Black share are preferred given their relevance (correlation with ethnic
heterogeneity). Moreover, both performed well on standard weak instru-
ment tests and condition on the controls we include in our analysis, these
instrument should satisfy exclusion restrictions.22
The biggest concern in the IV analysis is whether relevant instruments
satisfy exclusion restrictions. We argue that our instruments are valid as we
19 It is important to note that we could have also tested for time differences in the impact
of ethnic fractionalization by pooling all the data and interacting ethnic fractionalization
with time dummies. However, given the length of time that has elapsed between each
survey year, assuming other parameters in the social capital model do not change over
time might not be appropriate.
20 It is possible to argue that using inequality within a county may not satisfy exclusion
restrictions, given Alesina and La Ferrara suggested an association between social cap-
ital and inequality. However robust empirical evidence of this relationship is lacking.
They find that when appropriate controls are included inequality does not have statis-
tically significant effect on social capital. However inequality is correlated with ethnic
fractionalization- making it a possible IV choice.
21 The exception occurs in the estimation using the 1997 survey. In this instance using the
Black share IV alone is preferred but estimates using both instruments and just Black
shares produces estimates that are not statistically different (-0.437 using Black share
alone vs -0.462 using both.).
22 Examples of weak instrument tests we conduct include “first-stage F-statistics”, Shea
partial R2, Stock-Yogo (2005) bias method.
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that there is still an omitted variable within a county that is time varying,
affects social capital, and is correlated with ethnic fractionalization in the
county.24
Our third estimation strategy addresses the potential limitation of the
fixed effects model by making use of IV/ 2SLS estimation methods. The
only difference here compared to our prior IV analysis, is that here we pool
all the data and include year dummies. Similar to our previous IV specifi-
cation, the main assumption for consistent estimation of β1 are valid instru-
ments (E(µc,t|zct = 0).
Our fourth strategy exploits the panel nature of the data along with the
use of an IV approach. This approach refereed to as FE-IV is useful in light
of the probable existence of county level fixed effects and the distinct pos-
sibility that ec,t is correlated with c,t. In this case, we need to make use of
instruments zc,t which are correlated with ect, but are not correlated with ct.
The FE-IV estimation strategy given its advantages, is our preferred specifi-
cation for deriving consistent estimates.25
Strategy to Test for the Relevance of Hypotheses
The contact hypothesis suggests that greater levels of diversity lead to in-
creased social capital in communities. To empirically test this hypothesis
we focus on the estimated β1 in our IV and fixed effect models. Our null
hypothesis is β1 ≤ 0. We reject our null hypothesis if β1 > 0, meaning con-
tact claim is relevant. Failing to reject the null implies: (1) If β1 = 0 then
our results suggests that none of the theories are consistent with trends in
U.S.data. (2) Alternatively, if β1 < 0 then either the conflict hypothesis or
hunker-down hypothesis is relevant. It is important to mention that our esti-
mation strategy does not allow specific differentiation between the conflict
and hunker-down hypotheses. To provide evidence for or against either of
these notions, we look at trends at the bottom and the top of the ethnic frac-
tionalization distribution. We discuss this prima facie evidence in the results
section.
6 Results
6.1 Summary of Estimated Effects for Basic Control Variables
Before addressing our two key questions, it is useful to examine the esti-
mated coefficients for the control variables in the estimated models summa-
24 One potential drawback of using the fixed effect model with few time periods is the
limited variation over which potential effects are being identified.
25 It is important to mention that in both the panel estimation and the models using pooled
data, we cluster our standard errors given that our variable of interest varies at the county
level.
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rized in Tables (5-9). While some of the control variables generally hold in-
tuitive relationships with social capital throughout all of the different spec-
ifications, the signs of some control variables vary across specifications. In
instances where estimates of controls change significantly across specifica-
tion, we focus on estimated relationships in our preferred model.26
The level of education shows a positive relationship with social capital
across time. In effect, a county that holds proportionally more undergradu-
ate degrees tends to have a greater level of social capital. Educated people
are more likely to be employed in workplaces that place greater importance
on teamwork and building social connections. We can also argue that skilled
occupations are scalable and have more flexible working conditions, which
allow more time to engage in the production of social capital.
Whether a community is urban shows a significant, negative relation-
ship with social capital across time. Urban environments are generally per-
ceived as less social, possibly due to higher crime or less social space. Res-
idence time, the approximate total time an individual spends in a city or
town, shows a negative, but insignificant relationship with social capital.
A possible reason for this is the difficulty in approximating residence time
accurately. The percentage of working women shows a significant positive
relationship with social capital. This result suggests that more women in the
workplace increases social capital, which corroborates the reasoning behind
the relationships for level of education.
The variables income per capita, percentage of family households, and
median age show different relationships depending on the model specifi-
cation. Our preferred specification (IV-FE) summarized in Table (8) reveals
a significant positive relationship between income per capita in a county
and social capital. Further, the percentage of family households also shows
a positive, but non-significant relationship with social capital. Population
density shows a negative relationship with social capital. Median age shows
a negative and significant relationship, while the square of median age shows
a positive significant relationship. This result suggests a nonlinear relation-
ship between social capital formation and median age of individuals in a
community.27
6.2 Testing for time differences
Columns (1)-(3) of Table (5) summarize OLS results across our three time
periods 1990, 1997, and 2005 and provide a benchmark for possible esti-
26 While the control variables we include in our model are similar to RGF (2006), we only
include a subset of the controls used in RFG (2000) and as a result we do not directly
compare our estimates to theirs. However, the direction of the estimated coefficients of
the subset of variables common to both papers, are similar in most cases although the
magnitudes differ.
27 If we do not include a quadratic term for median age the estimate on median age in the
IV-FE is positive and more consistent with other specifications.
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Table 5 - Testing for Time Differences: OLS Regression and IV ResultsTable A5: Testing for Time Differences: OLS Regression and IV Results
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 1997 2005 1990 1997 2005
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.427*** -0.457*** -0.497** -0.344* -0.462** -0.591**
(0.136) (0.163) (0.196) (0.191) (0.218) (0.244)
Income Per Capita -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Family Households -0.045*** -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.044*** -0.055*** -0.051***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Median Age 0.477*** 0.236*** 0.132** 0.478*** 0.236*** 0.131**
(0.055) (0.055) (0.059) (0.054) (0.054) (0.058)
Square of Median Age -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban -0.570*** -0.435*** -0.871*** -0.571*** -0.435*** -0.873***
(0.138) (0.156) (0.231) (0.137) (0.155) (0.229)
Population Density -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Residence Time 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Working Women 0.028** 0.033*** 0.049*** 0.028** 0.033** 0.048***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Constant -7.855*** -3.320** -2.342*
(1.160) (1.297) (1.384)
Observations 3108 3106 3106 3108 3106 3106
Adjusted R2 0.708 0.653 0.605 0.300 0.301 0.241
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
39
mated effects. In contrast, columns (4)-(6) summarizes the results across
the three time periods from the second stage of the IV estimation. The first
stage estimates for the cross-sectional IV analysis in columns (4)-(6) of Table
(5) are summarized in Table (A1) of the appendix columns(1)-(3).
We present results using our preferred instruments, the combination of
the Gini coefficient and the share of Blacks in a county. We posit that consis-
tent estimates can be derived given these instruments satisfy the exclusion
restriction conditional on the controls we have included in the analysis. See
appendix A for a detailed discussion on evidence in support of the instru-
ments. Furthermore, we do not worry too much about the consistency of
our estimates when testing for time differences. This is because our test for
time differences will be valid as long as any potential bias in our OLS or
IV estimates are time invariant. The first stage results (Table A1 in our ap-
pendix columns 1-3) reveals a strong positive relationship between ethnic
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fractionalization and both the Black share of the population in the county
and the Gini coefficient in the county.28
Our variable of interest in Table (5) is the estimated impact of ethnic
fractionalization on social capital for each survey year. Notice across the
three periods the estimated impact is negative using both OLS and IV. This
result suggests that an increase in ethnic fractionalization is negatively cor-
related with social capital. Our IV estimates are slightly larger than our
OLS estimates. This difference suggests that our OLS estimates are slightly
downward biased. Given that we can infer causal relationship using the IV
model, these results suggest that higher levels of ethnic fractionalization at
the county level leads to a decrease in social capital at the county level in
the three periods we analyze (1990, 1997 and 2005).
While these yearly IV estimates of the impact of ethnic fractionalization
are useful, our first question is focused on investigating the existence of time
differences in the impact of ethnic fractionalization on social capital. To ad-
dress this question, as noted in our empirical section, we test for statistical
difference in the estimated impact of ethnic fractionalization on social capi-
tal across the three survey periods using T-tests.
Formal testing for statistical difference is important as we cannot con-
clude the existence of time difference based on simply observing changes in
coefficient magnitudes. Specifically, in both the OLS and IV specifications
the magnitude of the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization on social
capital is increasing over time. For example, the estimated negative impact
rose by 0.07 from 1990 to 2005 using OLS. Alternatively, in the IV model the
negative impact rose by 0.247 from 1990 to 2005. However, these increases
in the estimated impacts across survey years does not provide evidence of
statistical difference. Results from a two-sample mean-comparison test sug-
gests that estimates of the impact of ethnic fractionalization are not statisti-
cally different i.e., that there is no statistical difference between estimates in
1990 and 1997, 1990 and 2005, and 1997 and 2005.
The conclusion from this analysis is that while ethnic fractionalization
has a negative impact on social capital and this effect has persisted over
time, this effect has not changed in magnitude over our survey period (1990-
2005). This finding suggests that there are no time differences or time het-
erogeneity in the impact of ethnic fractionalization on social capital between
1990 and 2005.
6.3 Testing for Evidence of Contact, Conflict or Hunker-down
To provide evidence for or against the contact hypothesis, we focus on
the estimated effects using the pooled data. Table (6) provides a summary
of the estimated impact of ethnic fractionalization on social capital using
28 Notice in three of the four cases, the sign on the estimated impact of Gini and the share
of Blacks in a county is positive and significant at least at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6 - Testing Contact Hypothesis: OLS, FE and 2nd stage IV ResultsTable A6: Testing Contact Hypothesis: OLS, FE and 2nd stage IV Results
Dependent Variable: Other Specifications 2nd Stage: IV Analysis
Social Capital (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Fixed Effect Preferred IV 2 IV 3
Instruments Democratic Vote Lead Vote
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.424*** -0.891** -0.453** -3.334*** -9.029***
(0.140) (0.391) (0.186) (0.537) (1.516)
Income Per Capita -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.028*** 0.011 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.031***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Family Households -0.049*** -0.005 -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.074***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Median Age 0.155*** -0.301*** 0.154*** 0.129*** 0.079
(0.035) (0.044) (0.035) (0.036) (0.051)
Square of Median Age -0.001* 0.004*** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Urban -0.646*** -1.003*** -0.646*** -0.641*** -0.632***
(0.140) (0.273) (0.139) (0.141) (0.153)
Population Density -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Residence Time -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Working Women 0.040*** 0.029** 0.040*** 0.026** -0.003
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Year (1997) -0.561*** -0.077* -0.559*** -0.384*** -0.036
(0.026) (0.041) (0.028) (0.043) (0.098)
Year (2005) -1.006*** -0.226*** -1.003*** -0.683*** -0.049
(0.040) (0.064) (0.043) (0.074) (0.178)
Constant -1.911** 6.176*** -1.882** 0.897 6.392***
(0.893) (1.271) (0.901) (1.047) (1.889)
Observations 9320 9320 9320 9320 9320
Adjusted R2 0.627 0.070 0.627 0.586 0.271
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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the different estimation strategies highlighted above. Columns (1) provides
OLS estimates, column (2) provides estimates using the FE method, and in
columns (3) -(5) we summarize the estimates using alternative instruments.
Column (3) presents results using our preferred instruments (the Gini co-
efficient and the Black share in the county). Columns (4)-(5), in contrast,
provide estimated effects using democratic vote in a county and share of
lead vote in the closest presidential election as instruments. Table (A1) in
the appendix columns (4) to (6) provide a summary of the first stage results
of the three IV estimations in Table (6).29
29 In this pooled analysis just as in the individual year IV analysis, only a combination of
the Gini and Black Share satisfies the over-identification restriction test. This is why we
use the other two instruments individually.
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The strength of the fixed effect model is the identification of the relation-
ship between ethnic fractionalization and social capital using within county
variation. However, the possibility that ethnic fractionalization in a county
is correlated with both an unobservable within the county and with social
capital is our rationale for also exploring an IV strategy. All the estimates
of β in Table (6) are negative and significant. Given this negative relation-
ship in all cases, we can clearly reject the contact hypothesis. Therefore, in
the case of the U.S., the conflict or hunker down hypotheses are more relevant
in explaining what happens to social capital with increased diversity. It is
worth noting that though magnitudes differ across the OLS, FE and IV (1)
specifications, estimates are not statistically different.30
Another observation from Table (6) is that estimated effects when we
use either the democratic vote share or the lead vote share as instruments
are statistically different from the estimated effects using the OLS, FE and
the preferred instruments. Though it appears that these instruments satisfy
exclusion restrictions both are more likely to suffer from weak instrument
issues given the low correlation between these instruments and ethnic frac-
tionalization.31. It is also worth mentioning that even if the estimates of β
are consistent using the two alternative instruments, we are not overly con-
cerned with the difference between these estimates and our preferred IV
estimates, given that instrumental variables estimators generally estimate
local average treatment effects (LATE), with the specific average depending
on the choice of instruments.32.
In Table (7) columns (1) to (3), we present the results using an IV-FE esti-
mator. Column (1) provides results using the Gini coefficient and the share
of Blacks in a county as instruments. Columns (2) and (3) provides estimates
when we instrument for ethnic fractionalization using the percent of people
voting democratic in a county and the percent of the county voting for the
leading party as instruments, respectively. The IV-FE specification allows
us to combine the benefits of IV and fixed effects. However, it is important
to mention that the potential for weaker correlation between the instrument
and ethnic fractionalization is higher here given we are identifying effects
using variation within a county. The benefit is that the instruments are more
likely to satisfy exclusion restrictions.33 We concentrate our discussion on
30 We test to see if estimated effects are statically different using T-tests and fail to reject our
null of equal means across OLS vs FE estimates, OLS vs preferred IV estimate and FE vs
preferred IV estimates.
31 See first stage results in Table (A1) columns (5) and (6) in the appendix for estimated
effects.Though these instruments have F stats greater than 10, the Shea Partial R2 is less
than 0.1 when either alternative IVs are employed which is in contrast to 0.45 for our pre-
ferred IV specification. When instruments are weak, IV estimates may not be consistent
as the 2SLS estimator with weak instruments is biased in small samples. The aforemen-
tioned issues make us more cautious about the large estimated effects with the alternative
instruments.
32 Angrist and Imbens (1995).
33 It is worth mentioning that first stage estimates (not included in the paper) using our
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Table 7 - Testing for Evidence of Putnams’s TheoriesTable A7: Testing for Evidence of Putnams’s Theories
IV-Fixed Effects Estimates Evidence of Instrument Validity
2nd Stage Estimates
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Social Capital IV 1 IV-2 IV-3 OLS OLS OLS
Ethnic Fractionalization -3.318*** 3.834 -26.393*** -0.402** -0.400** -0.270
(1.257) (3.420) (6.228) (0.190) (0.191) (0.195)
Black Proportion -0.036 -0.028 0.184
(0.130) (0.131) (0.140)
Gini Coefficient -0.278 -0.258
(0.632) (0.643)
Democratic Vote -0.007***
(0.001)
Leading Party Vote 0.011***
(0.001)
Income Per Capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.014** 0.003 0.050*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Family Households -0.003 -0.010 0.020* -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.056***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Median Age -0.319*** -0.266*** -0.489*** 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.166***
(0.044) (0.051) (0.075) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Square of Median Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urban -1.012*** -0.985*** -1.102*** -0.646*** -0.647*** -0.560***
(0.274) (0.274) (0.332) (0.140) (0.140) (0.142)
Population Density -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Residence Time -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Working Women 0.022 0.042** -0.041** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.036***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Year (1997) 0.032 -0.289* 1.066*** -0.562*** -0.557*** -0.491***
(0.069) (0.157) (0.278) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030)
Year (2005) -0.036 -0.595** 1.769*** -1.008*** -1.001*** -1.100***
(0.118) (0.271) (0.487) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043)
Constant -1.902** -1.717* -2.014**
(0.894) (0.992) (1.016)
Observations 9319 9319 9319 9320 9320 9320
Adjusted R2 -0.409 -0.446 -1.856 0.627 0.627 0.633
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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our preferred IV-FE results in column (1) of Table (7) but also present the
estimated effects using the alternative instruments for completeness.34
preferred IV-FE method are still very strong and we do not worry about weak instrument
issues. Also the Hansen J-test for over-identification restrictions still suggests that at least
one of these preferred IVs is valid.
34 As noted with the IV estimation, although these alternative instruments pass the first
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Table (7) shows that the estimate of β using IV-FE and our preferred
instruments is negative and similar to the estimates summarized in Table
(6) using other estimation methods. These results suggest that increases in
ethnic fractionalization leads to a decline in social capital. Hence, we reject
contact hypothesis and posit that our findings are consistent with the conflict
and/or hunker down hypotheses.35
Note that the estimated effect using the IV-FE is much larger than using
the IV or FE models: -3.318 versus 0.453 and 0.891.36 This larger magnitude
is not a surprise given identification of effects are different using both mod-
els. In the regular IV, we identify effects using variation in the instrument
within a state, but in the case of the IV-FE we are identifying effects using
variation in the instrument within a county over time.
6.4 Robustness Checks
So far our different model specifications have all led to the rejection of
contact hypothesis. However, one of the challenges in considering social
capital is how it is measured. In this paper we make use of an index that
is readily available and put together by researchers with a lot of knowledge
in this field. However, this index measure is not without its limitations.
One limitation mentioned earlier, is the changing way people connect and
potential generational differences. In addition, it is possible to argue that
our results may be tied to our use of this particular index of social capital.
While we do not have data on other potential alternative measures of social
capital at the county level or proxies for social capital for our data periods,
we can investigate separately the possible relationship between some of the
indicators used to construct the index and our variable of interest, ethnic
fractionalization.
Table (8) summarizes the results of estimating our preferred model IV-
FE using instead of social capital index, six variables that potentially could
be used separately to proxy for social capital. These variables are all a part
of the social capital index we use in the above analysis. In Panel A the two
proxies for social capital are the number of bowling centers in a county and
the number of civic and social associations in a county controlling for pop-
ulation size. In Panel B we proxy for social capital using the total number
of golf courses and the total number of religious organizations divided by
stage F > 10 rule of thumb, we are concerned that estimates using these instruments
may be inconsistent given low Shea partial R2s and the weak correlation between these
two alternative instruments and the endogenous variable in the first stage.
35 It is useful to mention that although we do not focus on the estimates using our alter-
native instruments, the democratic share instrument in (column 2) provides results that
suggest no significant relationship between ethnic fractionalization and social capital. In
contrast, the lead share IV (column 3) suggests a negative relationship which is consistent
with our preferred IV-FE model and our other specification results.
36 This effect is also statistically different from the estimates derived using the OLS, IV and
FE.
Copyright c© 2018 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 26
Belton, Huq and Oyelere: Diversity and Social Capital in the U.S.
Table 8 - Robustness Check: Alternative Measures of Social CapitalTable A8: Robustness Check: Alternative Measures of Social Capital
(1) (2)
(IV-FE) (IV-FE)
Panel A
Number of civic groups Number of bowling places
Ethnic -0.000183* -0.000037
Fractionalization (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 9319 9319
Panel B
Number of religious organizations Number of golf courses
Ethnic -0.000802*** -0.000054
Fractionalization (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 9319 9319
Panel C
Census response rate Number of Professional organizations
Ethnic -0.003005 -0.000045
Fractionalization (0.005) (0.000)
Observations 8563 9319
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table provides a summary of 8 FE-IV estimations.
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population size. Finally, in Panel C we proxy using the total number of pro-
fessional groups divided by population and the response rate to the census
in a county.
The results in Table (8) suggest that even with these proxies for social
capital which may be less precise, most coefficients on ethnic fractionaliza-
tion are negative, though many are insignificant. It is worth noting that
the effect of ethnic fractionalization is significant in the specification using
membership of social associations and provides inferences consistent with
our highlighted finding. The results of our robustness checks are consistent
with Putnam’s conflict or hunker down hypotheses. The consistence of our
estimates using component parts of the social capital index suggests that
the social capital index, though not perfect, is a good measure and our core
findings are not specifically dependent on the derivation of the social capital
index.
6.5 Conflict versus Hunker Down Hypotheses
Our findings highlighted above suggest that U.S data is not consistent
with the contact hypothesis but is compatible with both the conflict and
hunker down thesis. For the conflict hypothesis increases in ethnic diver-
sity leads to lack of trust of those joining the group and a decreased invest-
ment in social capital. In contrast, the hunker-down notion suggests that
an increase in ethnic diversity causes members of a group to distrust not
just out-group members, but also in-group members. While our data does
not allow direct testing to determine which hypothesis is more relevant in
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/263 27
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 9 - Issue 2, Fall - Winter 2018, Article 1
a regression framework,37 we explore other ways of providing suggestive
evidence for or against either of these hypotheses. First, we isolate counties
that fall into the lowest quartile of ethnic fractionalization in the 1990 sur-
vey and remain in this quartile in the other survey years. Next, we isolate
counties that remain in the top quartile for ethnic fractionalization in the
three survey periods. Using simple bar graphs and basic summary statis-
tics, we compare and contrast the trends in social capital in these counties
over time. 38 Initially, we note that mean social capital values in the coun-
ties with low fractionalization is significantly higher in each year than for
counties with high fractionalization. This observation similar to our econo-
metric analysis is not consistent with contact theory but rather consistent
with the alternatives. To provide evidence for or against hunker down the-
ory, we compare our 1990 to 2005 values. We do not compare 1990 to 1998
because there is not a substantial change in mean ethnic fractionalization
over these two periods. However, there is significant change in mean ethnic
fractionalization between 1990 and 2005. In counties with low fractionaliza-
tion, small increases in ethnic fractionalization cannot significantly impact
a communities’ cohesion and mean social capital negatively unless this in-
crease leads to a change in interaction among those of the dominant ethnic
group. This is because the entry of few people of a different ethnicity into
a homogeneous community can only create a limited number of new in-
teractions. Even if these new interactions between the majority group and
the new entrants do not lead to trust, they cannot negatively alter the level
of social capital within the community in a statistically significant way as
long as trust between those of the dominant ethnicity within this commu-
nity does not change. Hence in counties with low fractionalization, evidence
for the hunker-down hypothesis can only be found if small increases in eth-
nic fractionalization is associated with a statistically significant decrease in
mean social capital. Figure (4) indicates that mean social capital increased
in these low fractionalization counties between 1990 and 2005 despite en-
trance of out-group members. This finding is inconsistent with what the
hunker down hypothesis will predict. It is important to mention that this
increase in social capital was not just a trend effect because when we con-
sider counties with ethnic fractionalization in the top quartile (Figure 5), we
find that mean social capital decreased between 1990 and 2005 while ethnic
fractionalization increased. One possible argument that could be made is
that comparing Figure (4) and (5) is not appropriate because counties with
high diversity in 1990 could be poorer and should have lower levels of so-
cial capital ceteris paribus. It is this idea of a correlation between ethnic
fractionalization and income that led to our including income as one of the
37 In an earlier version of our paper (Belton, Huq and Uwaifo Oyelere (2014)), we attempt
to test for hunker down hypothesis and find evidence against its relevance within a re-
gression framework.
38 See Figures (4) and (5).
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control variables in our regression analysis and also guided identifying ef-
fects using within county versus across county variation.
Figure 4 - Mean Social Capital vs Ethnic Diversity in counties in the lowest quartile
of Ethnic Fractionalization Overtime
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Figure 5 - Mean Social Capital vs Ethnic Diversity in counties in the highest quartile
of Ethnic Fractionalization Overtime
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Figure 6 - Mean Real Per Capita Income in top and bottom quartiles overtime
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Figure (6) suggests that the marked difference in social capital between
figures (4) and (5) cannot be explained by income. Figure (6) shows mean
real per capital income (RPCI) in the counties highlighted in figures (4) and
(5). Notice that mean RPCI was actually higher in the most diverse coun-
ties in 1990 but increased at a slower rate than the counties which are less
diverse. In addition while the least diverse counties now have a higher
mean RPCI, the difference in means across both is relatively small and can-
not explain the huge gap in means of the social capital index for these two
sub-samples.
What do these three figures suggest? While we cannot use a regression
framework to test the conflict relative to hunker down thesis, the conflict
thesis appears more consistent with U.S data between 1990 and 2005. The
evaluation of the least and most diverse counties across the 1990 to 2005
time period provides prima facie evidence against Putnam’s hunker-down
notion. These results suggest that conflict hypothesis seems more consistent
with the patterns in our data i.e., as communities become more diverse,
there is less trust within the community stemming from less trust for those
in the out-group or those of other ethnicities. This lack of trust leads to less
willingness to invest in social goods leading to a decline in social capital.
7 Conclusion and Inferences
In this paper we first test for time differences in the impact of ethnic
fractionalization on social capital accumulation using OLS and IV methods.
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Subsequently, we check to see if any of theories of social interaction dis-
cussed in Putnam (2007) is consistent with our data using FE, IV and IV-FE
methods. Our results suggest that though ethnic fractionalization has in-
creased over time in the U.S., there is no significant change in the negative
impact of ethnic fractionalization on social capital. This result suggests that
the relationship between social capital and ethnic fractionalization is stable
over the evaluation period (1990-2005).
What does our results suggest about the claims highlighted in Putnam
(2007)? We find evidence against the contact hypothesis given the identifica-
tion of a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital.
Our results are consistent with the conflict hypothesis which suggests that an
increase in diversity leads to a decline in social capital. However, the magni-
tude of the estimated impact of ethnic fractionalization is small. Specifically,
our preferred model (IV-FE) [Table (8) columns (2)], reveals a coefficient of
(-3.318) implying that a 100% change in ethnic fractionalization would lead
to a 3.318 decline in the social capital index. A reasonable change in eth-
nic fractionalization is about 4% ( which is the change in the mean between
1990 and 2005) and this would lead to a change of approximately 0.13 in
social capital.39 Our evaluation of means for counties in the lowest and
highest quartile of ethnic fractionalization suggests that Putnam’s hunker-
downthesis does not appear consistent with our data.
It is important to mention that this analysis has one main limitations.
First, we consider social capital using pre-existing measures. Though con-
sistent with the way social capital was formed in the past, it is possible to
argue that these measures may not be as relevant for social capital forma-
tion for younger generations. Those born in the 70s and the Millennials
have grown-up with a huge internet presence, advanced communication
technologies, and social media. They are networking and forming groups
in ways that could be quite different from older generations and it is rea-
sonable to assume these groups will also create social capital. Hence, our
measure of social capital could be downward biased for the younger co-
horts. However since the period of data covered in our study is 1990-2005
which is before the explosion of social media, this argument may not be as
relevant in our study. Notice in Table 8 column (1) that the effect of age is
negative not positive which goes against what one would expect if younger
cohorts were less likely to accumulate social capital than older cohorts, in
ways captured by our data.
In summary, our results suggest that between 1990 to 2005, as commu-
nities evolved in the U.S, and ethnic fractionalization increased, individu-
als’ trusted new entrants less which lead to less social capital accumulation.
However, this cost of increased immigration and migration, which are the
primary sources of increase in ethnic diversity in communities, could be far
out weighed by the documented private benefits of immigrant and migrant
39 A change of 0.13 is a small change in our social capital measure.
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increases within communities in the U.S. Hence, though diversity may lead
to a decrease in social capital as captured by our measures, our results do not
provide evidence of the impact of diversity on other welfare outcomes or al-
ternative measures of social capital. Given the nature of our finding, further
studies are needed to determine whether the positive effects of diversity
and immigration outweighs the potential negative effects on social capital.
In addition, studies understanding why increased diversity seems to lead to
decreased trust are useful. Moreover, coming up with initiatives and poli-
cies to increase social capital is useful for future societal health. There is also
a need for a more comprehensive measure of social capital that includes in
its calculation, the types of groups and networks to which the younger co-
horts belong. Finally, it is important to reiterate that our results capture
the relationship between social capital and ethnic fractionalization between
1990 and 2005. A lot has changed in the last 12 years that could affect the
way different groups view each other and interact. In particular U.S elected
its first non-White President in 2008 which could be an indicator of a change
in interactions across group. In future research, we hope to reexamine the
relationship between social capital and ethnic fractionalization post 2006.
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Appendix
Appendix A:
Table A1 - First Stage IV Results (Dependent Variable -Ethnic Fractionalization)
Table A9: First Stage IV Results (Dependent Variable -Ethnic Fractionaliza-
tion)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 1997 2005 Pooled Pooled Pooled
IV 1 IV 1 IV 1 IV 1 IV 2 IV 3
Black Proportion 0.759*** 0.693*** 0.711*** 0.726***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.017)
Gini Coefficient 0.393*** 0.167* 0.040 0.128***
(0.108) (0.086) (0.083) (0.049)
Democratic Vote 0.003***
(0.000)
Percent of Presidential -0.002***
Vote for Leading Party (0.000)
Income Per Capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education -0.001** -0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Family Households -0.000 -0.001 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urban 0.012 0.005 -0.006 0.007* -0.011** -0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Population Density 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3108 3106 3106 9320 9320 9320
P-value Hansen test 0.2549 0.0141 0.6335 0.8711 NA NA
Adjusted R2 0.835 0.828 0.823 0.827 0.710 0.690
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
IV 1 Are our preferred Instruments while IV2 and IV3 are alternative instruments.
Note* We also controlled for median age, square of median age, residence time and share of
working women (coefficients not included).
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Appendix B: Building a Case for the Validity of the Instruments
First, evidence of the relevance of both instruments can be found in our
first stage estimates in Table (A1) in our appendix columns(1)-(3). These
results reveals a strong positive relationship between ethnic fractionaliza-
tion and both the Black share of the population in the county and the Gini
coefficient in the county. Notice in three of the four cases, the sign on the
estimated impact of Gini and the share of Blacks in a county is positive and
significant at least at the 10 percent level.
We are also confident in our choice of instruments as our preferred in-
struments Black share and Gini coefficient pass the Hansen J test for overi-
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dentification restriction in the 1990 and 2005 surveys (suggesting that at
least one of them is valid). Our instruments also performed well on other
tests for weak instruments. We mention some these tests earlier in the paper
but do not present weak instrument test statistics to restrict table length to
a page. These test results are available on request.
Although we posit that these instruments satisfy exclusion restrictions, a
possible source of concern is whether both instruments are valid. While we
argue that our instruments are valid, the over-identification test only sug-
gests that at least one instrument is valid. We provide evidence of the lack
of independent effect of our instruments on social capital by estimating a
pooled regression of social capital on ethnic fractionalization, while includ-
ing our preferred instruments and other controls. We provide these results
in columns (4) and (5) of Table (7). Notice that both the share of Blacks and
Gini coefficient are not significant which provides evidence they have no
direct effect on social capital. Instead, the only way our instruments impact
social capital is through their effect on ethnic fractionalization. Notice in
column (4) of Table (7) that Black share has no significant impact on social
capital once ethnic fractionalization is included in the model. In column
(5) we add the Gini coefficient and again notice that neither Black share nor
Gini have a significant impact on social capital.If we exclude ethnic fraction-
alization from the regression and only included Black share or Gini we find
a significant effect of these variables which is evidence of the correlation
between these variables and ethnic fractionalization. While these results do
not prove validity, they provide strong evidence in favor of our instruments.
Appendix C: Description of Independent Variables used in Anal-
ysis
The ethnic fractionalization variable measures the level of diversity within
a county.
Ethnic Fractionalization = 1−
∑
i
(Race Proportioni)
2 |
i = Black, White, Asian, Latino
where the race proportion is the proportion of a population that iden-
tifies with race (i), which can be Black, White, Asian or Latino. This is the
same method used in Rupasingha et al (2006).
The racial dominance variable identifies the proportion of the majority
race in a given community. Larger values imply a more dominant race
within a county. Racial dominance is defined as follows:
Racial Dominance = max(Race V ariablei | i = Black,White,Asian, Latino).
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/263 37
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 9 - Issue 2, Fall - Winter 2018, Article 1
Racial dominance is defined across four racial groups, Black, White, Latino
and Asian.
The race proportions is calculated by dividing the population of race i
by the total number of Blacks, Whites, Latinos, and Asians in a particular
county.
Race Proportioni =
Race Populationi
Total Population
Ethnic fractionalization, racial dominance, and racial proportion data
were all derived from 1990, 2000, and 2005 for the 1990, 1997, and 2005
panels, respectively. Income per capita was collected from 1989, 1999, and
an average from 2005-2009 for the 1990, 1997, and 2005 panels, respectively.
Education level was collected from 1990, 2000, and an average from 2005-
2009 for the 1990, 1997, and 2005 panels, respectively.
The proportion of family households was derived from components gath-
ered from 1990, 2000, and an average from 2005-2009 for the 1990, 1997, and
2005 panels, respectively. The calculation for this variable is shown below:
Family Households = Total Number of Family Households
Total Number of Households
This represents the proportion of households that are family units.
Median age data was taken from the U.S. census of 1990, 2000, and 2010
for the 1990, 1997, and 2005 panels, respectively. We are forced to use me-
dian age data from 2010 rather than using 2000 census data for both 2000
and 2005 panels.
The determination of whether a county is urban was based on popu-
lation data collected from the 1990, 1997, and 2005 time periods for their
respective panels.
The calculation for population density is as follows:
Population Density = Total Population
Area
Total population data was collected from 1990, 1997, and 2005 time peri-
ods for the respective panels. Land area was collected from 1990, 2000, and
2010 for the 1990, 1997, and 2005 panels, respectively.
Residence time was approximated using an engineering equation to cal-
culate the time a particle spends in a specified vessel. An assumption be-
hind this equation is that a given town has the capacity for a set amount of
people, which is more accurate over a short period of time. The equation is
as follows:
Residence T ime = 10 ∗ Total Population
∆Population10 years
The 10 year change in population was collected from change from 1980-
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1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2010 for the the 1990, 1997, and 2005 panels, re-
spectively.
The percentage of women working in the overall population was calcu-
lated with the following equation:
Working Women = 100 ∗ Total Number of Working Women
Total Population
Data on the total number of working women in a county was collected
from components gathered from 1990, 2000, and an average from 2005-2009
for the 1990, 1997, and 2005 panels, respectively.
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